Abstract-Spectrum trading markets are of growing interest to many spectrum management agencies. They are motivated by their desire to increase the use of market based mechanisms for spectrum management and reduce their emphasis on command and control methods. Despite the liberalization of regulations on spectrum trading in some countries, spectrum markets have not yet emerged as a key spectrum assignment component. The lack of liquidity in these markets is sometimes cited as a primary factor in this outcome.
I. INTRODUCTION
PECTRUM trading is a market based mechanism for spectrum assignment which, in the ideal case, allows buyers and sellers to determine the assignments of spectrum and its uses. Thus, it allows access to spectrum to those who value it most and for the establishment of more dynamic market-driven and competitive wireless communication markets.
Spectrum trading markets are of growing interest to many spectrum management agencies. They are motivated by their desire to increase the use of market based mechanisms for spectrum management and reduce their emphasis on command and control methods. In general, traditional spectrum allocation and assignment mechanisms have focused on avoiding interference between users and on the type of use given to spectrum rather than on the efficient use of this resource and the maximization of economic benefits.
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Spectrum auctions have become a common technique for regulatory agencies to assign spectrum to new users. Once the auction is over, however, the license holders do not get feedback about the current valuation of spectrum. Thus, they may not continually evaluate their balance between investments in spectrum licenses and their investments in technology. Continual valuation feedback might stimulate spectrum users to invest in more efficient radio technology. Further, investors in companies that hold spectrum would be able to get a more accurate assessment of the value of that asset, which may be critical for their investment decision making.
For economically-driven spectrum assignment to be optimally effective, a secondary market must exist that allows spectrum users to optimally choose between capital investment and spectrum use on a continuous basis, not just at the time of initial assignment [3] . Spectrum trading leaves assignment and allocation decisions to market forces by providing an environment where buyers and sellers determine the assignment of spectrum and its uses.
We make use of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE) to analyze spectrum trading markets and the behaviors of their participants which given their variety, would be difficult to study with conventional statistical and analytical tools. ACE is "the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents" [10] . An agent in an ACE model is a software entity with defined data and behavior. Agents can represent individuals, institutions, firms and physical entities. ACE methods have been used to study other spectrum markets as mentioned in [17] .
A Spectrum Trading market modeling tool (SPECTRAD) has been developed as part of our research work and makes use of ACE methods and concepts. With this tool, we model the participants in a ST market over a set of different scenarios.
Our focus is on analyzing market liquidity and sustainability characteristics and using these results to determine the conditions for viability of these markets. As a first step in this analysis we have chose to examine spectrum markets where only one wireless standard is used and the unit segments of tradable frequency have equal operational conditions (fungibility). Future work will examine more complicated scenarios.
This paper is organized as follows: section II describes the entities that participate in a spectrum trading market. In section III, the characteristics of exchange based spectrum trading markets are mentioned. Section IV describes our approach to modeling these markets. Section V describes the selected factors for determining market viability. The viable market scenarios and results from our models are presented in section VI. Section VII presents recommendations for the design of ST markets based on the results of this work. Section VIII presents our conclusions.
II. PARTICIPANTS IN A SPECTRUM TRADING MARKET
To understand the organization of and interactions in a spectrum trading (ST) market we need to know what entities participate in such a market. In [1] we elaborated a classification for market structures that support ST. This classification considered two main types of market structures for spectrum trading: over-the-counter (OTC) markets and exchange based market operation. We will focus on the exchange-based case as it offers a richer set of market behaviors. A description of the entities that participate in exchange-based ST markets and some of their functions is provided in the following sections.
Spectrum license holders (SLH)
Entity that owns a spectrum license which has been acquired either through an auction, spectrum trading or direct assignment by a regulatory agency and that offers its license for trading in exchange of financial compensation. This entity can be: A wireless service provider which has a license for the use of spectrum acquired either through a government led auction or the ST market. A spectrum exchange which has been assigned a spectrum trading band by a regulatory agency. A market maker
Spectrum license requestors (SLR)
Entity that submits bids for spectrum licenses to the ST market with the intent of acquiring the license. SLRs obtain spectrum for speculation or their own use.
An entity that acts as a SLR can be: A wireless service provider that wants to acquire spectrum for its own use A market maker A company/enterprise that acquires spectrum on behalf of another
Spectrum regulator
A spectrum regulator is a government entity that oversees the ST market and defines the regulations for its operation. It is also responsible for maintaining a spectrum availability and assignment database which is updated every time a spectrum trade is completed to register the identity of the new holder of spectrum.
Market makers
A market maker is basically a dealer that holds an inventory of spectrum and stands ready to execute a transaction when a SLR (buyer) or SLH (seller) desires. A market maker facilitates trading; it does not provide services with its inventory. It gets revenue through the spread between ask (sell) prices and bid (buy) prices for spectrum, and holds a spectrum inventory for negotiating and speculating.
Spectrum exchange
An entity which provides and maintains a market place or facilities for bringing together buyers and sellers of spectrum in which spectrum trading transactions can take place. It also publicizes prices and anonymizes trading entities.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF EXCHANGE BASED MARKET
In exchange based ST markets, the spectrum exchange is the central entity for market operation and is defined for our purposes as an organization made up of entities whether incorporated or unincorporated, which provide and maintain a market place or facilities for bringing together buyers and sellers of spectrum in which spectrum trading transactions can take place. We assume that spectrum exchanges make use of continuous double auctions as a mechanism to match buyers and sellers.
In general, an exchange denotes the idea of a central facility where buyers and sellers can transact. In the traditional sense, an exchange is usually involved in the delivery of the product. However, for a spectrum exchange to allow use of traded spectrum, the required devices do not need to be co-located in the exchange so the exchange might not be involved in the delivery of service.
We will consider that the spectrum exchange acts as a pooling point (POOL) if its facilities house the communication equipment that enable the delivery of wireless services through spectrum acquired by a buyer in the exchange. This kind of exchange also takes care of the configuration of equipment required to make the spectrum usable to the new license holder.
A non-pooling point exchange (NOPOOL) only delivers the authorization for use of spectrum to the buying party in a spectrum trade. The new SLH must then use this authorization to configure it's devices to make use of the spectrum it has just acquired.
From a functional perspective a spectrum exchange can be a band manager (BM) for a given segment of spectrum over a region or have no band manager functionality (NOBM). In the first case the exchange can support transactions where it can grant spectrum licenses to a SLR and then have these licenses be returned to it if the trading terms so specify, as in the case of spectrum leasing transactions. Thus leasing arrangements in addition to permanent license transfers can be supported on this exchange. In contrast to BM exchanges, a NOBM exchange will only facilitate the trading of spectrum among entities in the market without holding any spectrum inventory itself.
For scenarios where the exchange has BM functionality, the SLRs will send a request for spectrum to the exchange which, if possible, will assign spectrum to the requesting entity in the form of a timed lease within the band managed by the exchange.
For a spectrum exchange that does not have band manager functionality (NOBM), the entire spectrum it will handle for trading will come from market participants that use the exchange and make bids and offers of spectrum. It is worth mentioning that unless the market has defined a basic amount of bandwidth as a spectrum trading unit it will be very complicated to match bids and offers of spectrum without incurring in wasteful assignment of this resource. Although giving a particular structure to the way the spectrum trading band should be segmented will limit its operational flexibility, it also provides benefits in terms of simplifying the specifications to characterize a particular spectrum trade and managing interference between ST users.
Some additional functionalities of any type of spectrum exchange are:
• Receive and organize offers of spectrum to be traded from spectrum license holders • Receive and organize bids for spectrum from spectrum license requestors • Charge exchange membership fees • Charge transaction related fees (listing fee, clearing and settlement fee)
• Maintain an updated spectrum availability and assignment database.
From the previous discussion, the proposed classification generates four types of spectrum exchanges which can be used to implement a ST market. These are listed in table 1.
IV. MODELING OF ST MARKETS
By characterizing the trading, information overhead and infrastructure costs of different ST market implementation architectures and since we are interested in the running behavior (sustainability) of the market once its operating infrastructure has been put in place we find that the only differentiating factor between them is whether the exchange is organized to work as a band manager (BM) or not (NOBM) [3] . Thus, when modeling ST markets, scenarios with different exchange behavior have to be clearly differentiated.
Because of the complexity of the interactions in a ST market, we use agent-based computational economics (ACE) to study the possible behaviors and characteristics of these markets. Our focus is to determine the conditions over which spectrum trading markets are viable, where viability is determined by the liquidity and sustainability of the market.
When modeling markets, the agents representing market participants have limited (if any) knowledge of the decisions and state of other market participants (bounded rationality). Agents adapt their behavior based on their goals, their interaction with the market and/or other agents. In ACE modeling, once initial conditions have been specified, the evolution of the model is only dependent on the interactions among agents and given the diversity of interactions that can arise, it is difficult to perform straightforward causal analysis by tracking one market participant. Thus, ACE models provide a tool to observe the aggregate behaviors that emerge on a system from the individual behaviors of its components (agents). Analysis of these behaviors over several scenarios can provide insights into characteristics of new markets, the effect of economic policies and the roles of institutions.
A Spectrum Trading market modeling tool (SPECTRAD) has been developed as part of this research work and makes use of ACE concepts. The tool was developed using the JAVA programming language and works on top of the REPAST (Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit) platform developed by the Argonne National Laboratory [8, 9] . Since we are focusing on exchange based markets, the agents in our models represent the market participants present in these markets. The list of agents incorporated into our models is shown in table 2. The following subsections describe the assumptions and the behaviors of the market entities used in our models. Further details of the implementation of our models can be found in [3] .
A. General market setup and model assumptions
The following are the assumptions used in our models:
• One wireless standard is being used in the market • Interference conditions do not impact the services provided over a unit of traded spectrum. 
Agent Comments
Spectrum User This agent models a wireless service provider that participates in the ST market as a seller of spectrum (SLH) or buyer (SLR)
Market Maker
Entity that provides liquidity to the market. It will be present only in scenarios in which the exchange does not act as a band manager (NOBM scenarios)
Spectrum Exchange
Centralized entity that gathers and matches bids and asks for spectrum. It will act as a band manager in BM scenarios and not in this capacity in NOBM scenarios Spectrum Regulator Manages a spectrum availability and assignment database.
• Trading takes place over an exchange entity.
• Trading takes place over a single geographic service area over which the wireless services providers (modeled by Spectrum User agents) have enough radio base stations to cover the area and can trade spectrum with the help of a spectrum exchange.
In the market scenarios considered wireless service requests manifest to each spectrum user (SU) as requests of traffic to be served for which the SU has to determine if it has sufficient resources. The SUs can obtain resources to serve traffic either by acquiring spectrum in the form of Basic Bandwidth Units (BBUs) or by using a unit of transmission of an Alternate Technology (AT).
Investment in AT transmission units can resemble investing in equipment to make better use of spectrum already owned by the SU or in wireline technology, thus avoiding the purchase of additional BBUs. The choice between BBUs or ATs will be based on the economic benefit that a given SU might receive from making a selection as it tries to minimize its costs for providing wireless service. Each SU will have a fixed price for its choice of AT unit which does not change during the life of the market. Thus, if a SU is acting as a spectrum license requestor (i.e. buyer) when the market price for BBU is higher than its AT price, the SU will buy ATs and when BBU prices are lower or equal to its AT price, the SU will buy BBUs.
However, in order to make the behavior of a scenario more consistent with realistic parameters, once an AT unit is bought; it cannot be put into service immediately. We assume a one time tick delay (which can be mapped to an hour, a day, or a week depending on the time scale of choice) from the moment the AT unit is bought until it can be used. We also assume that the opportunity cost of not serving a given request for traffic is too high for the SU to incur. Thus, a SU can buy BBUs at a price higher than its AT choice price in order to get the transmission resources to serve traffic requests until its AT units are usable (activated). After the ATs are activated, the SU will put back in the market (sell) the BBUs for which it "overpaid". AT units have a finite lifetime, after which they become unusable.
In general, the simulation of a market scenario starts with a set of specified parameters that define the scenario. The parameter categories for the scenarios to be considered are:
• Number of market participants (N)
• Distribution of spectrum users' valuation level (L)
• Amount of available spectrum for trading (S)
• Exchange type: NOBM or BM (M)
B. Behaviors for ST market entities
Spectrum User Spectrum users (SUs) are the agents that model wireless service providers (WSPs) and which buy and sell spectrum in order to attend traffic requests (buy) or obtain economic gain (sell). Each SU serves a traffic demand that models the communication requirements imposed by its subscribers in a geographic area at a given time. The traffic to be served is mapped to a spectrum requirement expressed as the number of basic bandwidth units (BBUs) required by the SU to support the traffic load. If the SU cannot acquire BBUs, it will buy AT units as explained earlier.
For our analysis we model the aggregate traffic demand for each SU within the ST service area with an exponential distribution with a mean of μ traffic . The interval between changes of traffic demand is modeled as an exponential distribution with a mean of μ tchange . In this model, we assume that the traffic demands faced by SUs are independent.
In a NOBM exchange based market, the SUs submit requests to buy (bids) or sell (asks) to the exchange. The exchange collects these requests and tries to find the best match between requests to establish a trade. The SU can query the exchange for its current market quote, which contains the minimum ask and the maximum bid price posted in the market. SUs use this information in their pricing decisions. Additionally, a SU can post buy/sell orders that should execute immediately at the current best price of the market (market order) or it can specify to the exchange its desire to buy/sell BBUs at the best price possible but in no event pay/sell for more/less than a specified limit price (limit orders).
If a SU buys AT units, it is aware that they have a finite lifetime and that they should be decommissioned in the future based on their mean lifetime. Before the decommissioning time arrives, and if the SU does not have an active bid in the market, the SU posts a preventive bid for spectrum to acquire BBUs that can be used in place of the AT units that will be decommissioned. In this way, if the bid is successful, the SU does not incur the risk of having unmet traffic capacity that was being served by the AT units at the time of their decommissioning.
In a market with a BM exchange, the SUs post bids for spectrum and, depending on the amount of spectrum in the exchange's band and the amount of spectrum required by all the SUs, the exchange determines a cutoff price. The SUs with bid prices above the cutoff price get assigned spectrum.
SUs with winning bids get assigned spectrum leases for a time period T lease , after which they must submit a new bid. SUs always bid using prices below their alternate technology price. The SUs that bid above the cutoff get spectrum (BBUs) while the others will have to invest in AT units.
Spectrum exchange behavior
In NOBM exchange based market scenarios, the market starts with several bidding rounds to determine an initial starting price following a procedure similar to that in [4] . Once the prices have stabilized and been posted in the market, the bids and asks that are marketable are matched and a trade takes place.
After these initial trades, the market behavior switches to that of a continuous order-driven market in which spectrum users may trade at anytime they choose. Spectrum users can post either limit orders or market orders. After each post, the exchange updates its order book and if a trade can take place, it transfers the spectrum license from the seller (SLH) to the buyer (SLR) and records the details of the trading transaction. It also informs the Regulator agent about the trade so that it can keep track of who is the owner of each BBU in the market.
The exchange's order book keeps a record of the bids and asks currently active in the market and sorted by price. After each trade or if there was no trade, the exchange announces the market quote informing market participants of the current market ask price (best price at which spectrum is being sold in the market) and the current market bid price (it's the price of the best offer to buy spectrum in the market). This way, market participants can adapt their price behavior to make competitive bids or asks in the future.
A BM exchange will lease the BBUs in its managed band to SUs during t lease time periods. After the leasing period ends, the SUs must submit a new set of bids in order to have spectrum assigned to them. A bid for spectrum is accepted by the exchange and BBUs are assigned to the bidder if the bid price is above the exchange's cutoff price.
To determine the cutoff price, all SUs that require spectrum, submit at the start of a time period the amount of spectrum they need (in BBUs) and the price they want to pay for each BBU. The exchange seeks to maximize spectrum efficiency, that is, it seeks to assign as much of the spectrum from its band as it can and to the users that value it the most. Thus, it conducts several bidding rounds to determine a stable cutoff price. In each round, when the exchange receives the bids for spectrum it will organize them according to price, if spectrum demand is greater than the amount of spectrum in the band, the cutoff price will be that of the bid with which the band manager gets to assign all the spectrum.
All SUs with bid prices greater than or equal to the final cutoff price get assigned their requested BBUs and pay the exchange that price for each BBU. If spectrum demand is less than the amount of spectrum in the band, the cutoff price becomes the minimum cutoff price (P minCutoff ) for sustainable operation of the band manager and all SUs that posted bids get assigned their requested BBUs and pay P minCutoff for each of them. Figure 1 shows a flowchart illustrating the behavior of a BM exchange.
Market Maker
The market maker (MM) provides liquidity to the market and corrects market imbalances. The behavior of the market maker agent implemented in the models used in this research is that of an entity that stands ready to make bids for spectrum if no SU is posting a bid and it posts an ask offer if no SU is on the selling side of the market. This makes the market maker a very reactive entity that only intervenes in the market when there is a severe imbalance in it (i.e., no buyers or no sellers) with the objective of keeping the market alive [5] . Using a simplified market maker allows us to determine which market scenarios are viable without much economic intervention from entities that do not make use of spectrum (entities that do not provide wireless services).
The MM has an initial inventory of BBUs assigned to it which it uses to keep a bid-ask spread present at all times in the market. Only if its inventory is exhausted will it stop making the market and when this happens, trades in the market will not be completed and there will be unattended traffic capacity for at least one SU in the market.
When posting a bid, the MM's intervention signals a lack of buying activity in the market while there may be a lot of offers to sell spectrum, thus prices for BBUs should come down. When posting an ask, the MM's intervention signals a lack of selling activity thus prices for spectrum should increase.
Keeping in line with this behavior, if the MM's bid or ask becomes marketable (a SU buys from the MM or sells to the MM) the MM will decrease or increase its BBU price in the next bid or ask respectively in order to signal abundance or lack of spectrum in the market.
When market intervention by the MM is not required after T no_mm consecutive time periods, the MM will issue a bid or ask with the objective of getting its spectrum inventory back to its reference level which is the same as its initial spectrum inventory amount. Since the MM does not make use of spectrum it is convenient for the market if it sells any excess inventory that it may possess. If the MM's spectrum inventory is below its initial level it will post a bid to bring it back to its initial level so that the MM is better prepared to intervene the market when it is required.
Regulator Agent
A regulator agent models a regulator entity and oversees the trades being conducted in the market and updates a spectrum assignment database so that ownership of a given BBU could be verified if needed. In the scenarios considered in this research, we assume a liberalized spectrum environment (spectrum can be given any use and owned by any SU) thus the regulator does not restrict any trading interaction.
V. FACTORS FOR ST MARKET VIABILITY
SPECTRAD allows us to measure several parameters to study the behavior of a modeled market scenario. Since our focus is on determining the conditions for viable markets by means of their liquidity and sustainability behavior, we selected a set of parameters/measures as factors to characterize these markets.
A. Factors for NOBM exchange scenarios
Mid-Point price for spectrum BBU: The spectrum market quote contains the minimum Ask price (minAsk) and maximum Bid (maxBid) price for the selling or buying of a BBU respectively. These two prices are combined to produce the mid-point BBU price (midPrice BBU ) specified by the following equation:
This price gives an indication of the average price at which a BBU is being valued in the market. Low values of this measure would indicate an excess in supply or low spectrum demand in the market, while high values would indicate low supply or high demand for spectrum.
Relative bid/ask spread (relBA): The bid/ask spread is the difference between the best sell price (minAsk) and the best buy price (maxBid) in the market. The relative bid/ask spread is the size of the bid/ask spread relative to the midpoint price of the quoted asset. Thus relBA can be expressed as: (2) The usefulness of this factor in determining the viability of a market is that the relBA value can be used as an indicator for the liquidity of a market [6, 7] . If the relBA value for a market is high, it indicates that the separation between bid and ask prices is large, thus there would be high resistance in the market to go from a buying position to a selling position. When relBA is low, the resistance to conduct a trade is low because with a small change in price (relative to the mid-point BBU price) it would be easy for a market participant to establish a trade. In other words, high values of relBA indicate low liquidity in the market while low values of relBA would indicate high liquidity.
Market Maker's BBU inventory difference (MMInvDiff): If the value of the market maker's inventory differs substantially from its reference inventory level it indicates problems in the buying or selling side of the market. Thus, let's define the Market maker's inventory difference with its reference level as: (3) If in a market the MM is accumulating BBU inventory and can't release it, this implies that the MM always has to act as a buyer to make the market. This indicates that there is low demand for spectrum in that market and the value for MMInvDiff would be positive. If the MM is holding low levels of spectrum when compared to its reference level, it would indicate that there are problems in the supply of spectrum in the market and the value for MMInvDiff would be negative.
Percentage of offered spectrum (bbuOffered%): Expressing the amount of spectrum being offered for sale as a percentage of the total spectrum available in the market we have that if this percentage is high, the majority of the tradable spectrum is not in use by the SUs and thus it is being offered for sale. This would indicate low spectrum efficiency. In general, the lower the value of this percentage, the more efficiency there is in terms of spectrum use.
Number of complete market runs (numMkt):
For the collection of statistics to analyze each market scenario, 100 runs of the scenario are performed in SPECTRAD. In NOBM scenarios, activity in a market starts with a series of mock auctions so that the SUs can find an initial starting price at which to start trading. If this initial phase is not successful in finding a starting price, the market does not proceed to actual spectrum trading. This factor counts how many of the attempted market runs where successful in finding a stable starting price and thus initiate spectrum trading.
This factor is useful as an indicator of market viability since a high percentage of complete market runs, indicates that initiating trading is feasible without difficulty. In contrast, having a low percentage of complete market runs would indicate that the market structure is not well suited to support sustainable trading.
B. Factors for BM exchange scenarios
The set of selected factors for characterizing and determining BM market viability is the following:
Probability of an empty bid list (P noBids ): In a BM scenario, the SUs who's bidding price is below the cutoff price for a given time period will buy AT transmission units to serve their traffic demand requirements. As the market progresses and traffic demand changes, the AT inventory of a SU may be more than enough to satisfy its demand requirements and if this happens for all SUs in a market, none of them will need to request spectrum from the BM. The value of P noBids indicates the average probability that in a given time period there are no SUs making bids for spectrum. High values of this factor indicate that there is not enough activity in the market.
Probability that demand is greater than supply (P dGs ): Since a spectrum lease lasts for T lease time periods, when SUs present their bids for spectrum to the BM exchange at the end of their lease time, their total requested spectrum may not be enough for the BM to make the assignment of all the spectrum in its band. The value of P dGs indicates the average probability that in a given time period the demand for spectrum is not enough to fill the spectrum band.
Average cutoff price (avgPrice cutoff ): The average cutoff price (avgPrice cutoff ) gives an indication of the valuation of spectrum in a BM scenario. In these scenarios, all SUs whose bid price was above the cutoff price during that time period get assigned spectrum by the BM after they pay the cutoff price for each BBU. When there is not enough demand to fill the spectrum band, the cutoff price is minCutoff thus, if avgPrice cutoff is very close in value to minCutoff it indicates a market where there was not enough trading activity to drive the BBU price above minCutoff.
Percentage of assigned spectrum (BBU assigned %): High values of this percentage indicate a high degree of efficiency in the use of the spectrum given to the BM, while low values indicate the opposite.
Average number of AT units per spectrum user (AT su ): The average number of ATs per spectrum user (AT su ) can be used as an indicator of the difficulty or easiness to get spectrum in a market. On average a SU needs a total of 10 BBU or 10 AT units to serve its traffic requirements. If a SU is keeping an AT inventory above 10 units it would mean that on average it satisfies its traffic requirements only with AT transmission units and does not make use of spectrum.
VI. VIABILITY CRITERIA AND RESULTS
Different market scenarios were simulated by varying the values of the amount of tradable spectrum in the market (number of BBUs), the number of spectrum users present in the market and the distribution of spectrum users' valuations of spectrum (users with low valuations pay low prices for spectrum, those with high valuations can pay higher prices). The variation of the tradable spectrum amount and number of spectrum users are related in such a way that the value of the average number of BBUs per spectrum user (R) is in the set [5, 10, 15, 20, 25] . A summary of the values used for the parameters of the market scenarios modeled is shown in table 3. Each market scenario was run 100 times in order to get statistically meaningful data. Each run was executed for 5000 time ticks of which 3000 were used for the warm-up period. Data was collected on the last 2000 time ticks.
A. Results for NOBM scenarios
This section displays the results from the modeled NOBM market scenarios using SPECTRAD. The behavior of the market scenarios for each of the previously mentioned factors was analyzed based on the number of SUs for each scenario, the user distribution and the R value. It is worth mentioning that for all scenarios, when R is equal to 10, on average every spectrum user has enough spectrum to serve its average traffic requirement value. Thus R values lower than 10 indicate an under-supply of spectrum, while values greater than 10 indicate an over-supply of this resource to attend the average traffic needs of a SU.
1) Criteria for viable NOBM markets
In order to determine the viable NOBM markets based on the factors mentioned in section V, we need to develop decision criteria to determine if the behavior of a particular factor in a market is to be considered as desirable/acceptable (positive) or undesirable/unacceptable (negative). Additionally, in order to keep track of the aggregate behavior characteristics of a market we gave a score to each factor with a positive value when the market complies positively with the desired behavior characteristic or negative when it complies with the undesirable behavior criteria. Based on the total scores for a market's behavior a final list of viable markets was determined.
Most of the threshold values for each criterion were derived from the simulation data. Table 4 summarizes the criteria to be used to evaluate and give scores to the different scenarios studied in this work. Factors such as the percentage of completed market runs where given more weight than other factors given their relative importance in the determination of viability characteristics (sustainability in this case). 
Spectrum exchange architecture
The spectrum exchange can act either as a band manager (BM) or have no band manager functionality (NOBM) 
2) Viable NOBM markets
Using the list of criteria for scenario evaluation mentioned in table 4, the scores for the simulated scenarios are summarized in figure 2 . We consider markets with scores greater than 0 as viable. Scenarios with this condition meet several of the desirable conditions for a viable market. Additionally there is a gap in the score values with many scenarios with scores less than or equal to 0 and others with scores greater than or equal to 2.
The scenarios with scores greater than 0 all have a percentage of running markets > 50% which is a very desirable feature. We only show the scores for scenarios with user valuation distribution #1 (as defined in table 3) since there was no difference in terms of viable markets among scenarios with different valuation level distributions.
Based on the scores, we can say that most of the viable market scenarios are those that have R values that meet the condition 5 10 and a number of spectrum users (numSU) such that 6 50. When R=15, the viable scenarios are those with 10 20.
3) Viability implications NOBM spectrum trading markets are viable under the criteria used in this work for markets with a range of market participants (spectrum users) with a low limit of 6 (although cases with 5 SUs were viable when R=10) and a high limit of 50. Viability in these cases holds as long as there is no oversupply of spectrum, that is, when R=5 and R=10.
A value of R=5 indicates scenarios where on average there is 50% less spectrum per SU to serve the SU's average traffic requirement. A value of R=10 is the "reference" value where the amount of spectrum per user is very close to being enough to serve a SU's average traffic requirement and is where most of the viable scenarios are found. When R=15, there is a 50% oversupply of spectrum and in this case, the viable markets are those with 10 to 20 spectrum users. Thus, if there is little or no oversupply of spectrum and with a number of spectrum users greater than or equal to 6, most NOBM spectrum trading markets will be viable.
The implication of these findings for regulators is that they should allow trading in wireless service areas where there will be enough market participants (≥ 6) and sufficient spectrum use such that the amount of spectrum that can be traded will not lead to oversupply situations or excessive undersupply in the long run. Further work with different traffic patterns can be used to provide more precise limits to the amount of spectrum that should be available in the market.
Simple market makers as providers of liquidity, like the ones used in the models of this work, help in the establishment of viable markets by holding a spectrum inventory with which they can transact. Thus, regulators will not have to specify complex market maker behavior requirements or rules.
Since a market maker does not make use of its spectrum assigning too much inventory to a market maker would decrease spectrum efficiency. However, the greater the inventory level of the market maker the better prepared it would be to intervene in the market if there is a lack of spectrum offerings. Thus, regulators will need to define the level of spectrum holdings of a market maker to reach a desired balance of market viability vs. spectrum efficiency.
B. Results for BM scenarios
This section displays the results from the BM market scenarios modeled using SPECTRAD. The behavior of the market scenarios for each of the previously mentioned factors was analyzed based on the number of SUs for each scenario, the user distribution and the value of R.
1) Criteria for BM markets
In a similar manner to the development of viability criteria for NOBM markets, we will develop decision criteria to determine if the behavior of a particular factor in a market is to be considered as desirable/acceptable (positive) or undesirable/unacceptable (negative). We use a similar scoring procedure as that of NOBM scenarios in which we give a score to each factor with a positive value when the market complies positively with the desired behavior characteristic or negative when it complies with the undesirable behavior Table 5 summarizes the criteria to be used to evaluate and give scores to the different scenarios studied in this work. Figure 3 shows the scores obtained by the BM market scenarios analyzed in this work. We consider the viable BM markets to be those with score greater than 0 since these scenarios do not meet many of the undesirable criteria. Additionally, all viable scenarios have a percentage of assigned spectrum > 62%. We only show the scores for scenarios with user valuation distribution #1 (see table 3) since there was no difference in terms of viable markets among scenarios with different valuation level distributions.
2) Viable BM markets
The largest grouping of viable scenarios satisfy the conditions that 5 10 and that the number of users is such that 10 50. Other viable scenarios are found for the cases where R=10 and 5 10 and when R=15 and 10 20, irrespective of user distribution. Using the value of R as a grouping variable, we can also say that R=10 generates has the greatest number of viable markets. Viability is met when 5 50.
3) Viability implications BM spectrum trading markets are viable under the criteria used in this work for markets with a range of market participants (spectrum users) with a low limit of 5 and a high limit of 50 when R=10 which is the value of R at which there is no spectrum oversupply or undersupply. Thus a well balanced amount of spectrum in the market (enough spectrum to meet the average traffic demands of the SUs) produces viable markets in BM scenarios.
C. NOBM scenarios with speculative trading
We studied alternative market scenarios with SPECTRAD. In particular, we allowed for speculative trading behavior to take place in NOBM market scenarios. Each SU participating in the market could buy up to 20% more spectrum units (BBUs) than it needed if it determined that the BBU price trend is beneficial -buy low to later sell high. The market scores for this analysis are shown in figure 4 .
The viable market scenarios with speculation did not differ from the ones of the NOBM scenarios previously studied. However, in the viable scenarios, the average BBU price increased an average of 17% with a maximum of 65%. The analysis of scenarios where more complicated speculative behavior is allowed is left for future work. The viability implications for NOBM and BM scenarios were analyzed separately in previous sections. When looking at the viability conditions for both scenarios at the same time we can make the following additional observations and recommendations:
Amount of available spectrum for trading: Oversupply of spectrum negatively affected all market scenarios considered. In particular, an oversupply of 100% above the level of spectrum that the SUs need to serve their average traffic needs leads to unviable markets. An adequate amount of spectrum for trading should be made available in the market in order to maintain trading activity. Our scenarios showed viability with spectrum amounts 50% above or under the level spectrum needed to attend average traffic in the market.
Number of market participants: Spectrum trading is viable in markets with no excessive oversupply or undersupply of spectrum for a wide range of spectrum user values. However, when the number of spectrum users (numSU) is less than 6, NOBM markets are unviable. When numSU is less than 10, BM markets are unviable except for R=10 where markets are unviable when numSU is less than 5. Thus, an ST market requires a minimum number of participants to be viable. Regulators and entities interested in these markets must make sure that enough trading participants will be in the market. The results presented here can serve as a guideline but should be complemented by further study of market environments under different traffic (demand) patterns.
Additionally, it is worth taking into account that NOBM exchange based markets can support undersupply conditions better than BM markets but BM markets can operate with a lower number of spectrum users when the amount of tradable spectrum closely matches the amount required to serve their average traffic needs. BM markets are in general more sensible to oversupply and undersupply conditions than NOBM markets.
Spectrum efficiency: In the viable ST market scenarios, NOBM markets provided for spectrum efficiencies between 51% and 77% and for the BM cases, the efficiencies were between 78% and 93%. These results show a positive characteristic of spectrum trading markets that is of great interest to regulators and spectrum users. Analysis of spectrum efficiency in other market scenarios is left for future work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The outcomes of our study can help policy makers and wireless service providers (future and current) to understand the required conditions for implementing spectrum trading markets. The market and operational scenarios we used assumed a single wireless technology and the fungibility of spectrum. The restrictions were used to define initial scenarios (almost ideal) over which to study the dynamics of spectrum trading. Future work will make use of SPECTRAD to analyze more complicated scenarios.
Our models indicate that spectrum markets can be viable in a service if sufficient numbers of market participants exist and the amount of tradable spectrum is balanced to the demand. Given that a minimum of 5-6 active spectrum users (wireless service providers) are necessary in a particular service area, it seems unlikely that spectrum markets will be viable in mobile markets unless the barriers for market entry for new service providers are lowered. ST markets may well create the incentive for the appearance of new types of wireless service providers but without a truly liberalized ST market in place it is unlikely they will do so. Thus, a challenge for regulators and researchers alike will be identifying an appropriate band to promote spectrum trading or to facilitate the entry of new market participants.
The matter of balancing tradable spectrum to demand will prove more challenging for regulators because this requires insight into service demand. Thus, it will be important to develop useful (and observable) proxies that enable regulators to estimate how well markets are balanced. The viability of spectrum trading in more complicated trading scenarios (i.e more than one wireless standard and/or non-fungible spectrum), is left for future work. An important byproduct of our research is demonstrating how ACE can be applied to the study of telecommunication markets. Our methods and tools can be extended to the study of other telecommunications markets or scenarios where adaptive behaviors of the system participants are allowed and where studying the emergent behavior of the market is of interest.
